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Abstract We apply state-of-the art deductive veriﬁcation
tools to check security-relevant properties of cryptographic
software, including safety, absence of error propagation, and
correctness with respect to reference implementations. We
also develop techniques to help us in our task, focusing on
methods oriented towards increased levels of automation, in
scenarios where there are clear obvious limits to such au-
tomation. These techniques allow us to integrate automatic
proof tools with an interactive proof assistant, where the lat-
ter is used off-line to prove once-and-for-all fundamental
lemmas about properties of programs. The techniques devel-
oped have independent interest for practical deductive veri-
ﬁcation in general.
Keywords Cryptographic algorithms; program veriﬁca-
tion; program equivalence; self-composition.
1 Introduction
Software implementations of cryptographic algorithms and
protocols are at the core of security functionality in many IT
products. However, the development of this class of software
products is understudied as a domain-speciﬁc niche in soft-
ware engineering. The development of cryptographic soft-
ware is clearly distinct from other areas of software engi-
neering due to a combination of factors.
– Firstly, cryptography is an inherently interdisciplinary
subject. The design and implementation of cryptogra-
phic software draws on skills from mathematics, com-
puter science and electrical engineering. The assumption
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that such a rich body of research can be absorbed and
applied without error is tenuous for even the most expert
software engineer.
– Secondly, security is notoriously difﬁcult to sell as a fea-
ture in software products, even when clear risks such as
identity theft and fraud are evident. An important impli-
cation of this fact is that security needs to be as close to
invisible as possible in terms of computational and com-
munication load. As a result, it is critical that crypto-
graphic software be optimised aggressively, without al-
tering the security semantics.
– Finally, typical software engineers develop systems fo-
cused on desktop class processors within computers in
our ofﬁces and homes. The special case of cryptographic
software is implemented on a much wider range of de-
vices, from embedded processors with very limited com-
putational power, memory and autonomy, to high-end
servers, which demand high-performance and low-laten-
cy. Not only must cryptographic software engineers un-
derstand each platform and the related security require-
ments, they must also optimise each algorithm with re-
spect to each platform, since each one will have vastly
different performance characteristics.
Program Veriﬁcation is the area of Formal Methods that at-
tempts to check properties of software statically, with the
help of an axiomatic semantics of the underlying program-
ming language and a proof tool. Speciﬁcally, we are inter-
ested in techniques based on Hoare logic [20], brought to
practice through the use of contracts – speciﬁcations con-
sisting of preconditions and postconditions, annotated into
the programs. In recent years veriﬁcation tools based on con-
tracts have become more and more popular, as their scope
evolved from toy languages to very realistic fragments of
languages like C[18,6], C# [4], or Java[23]. We will use
the expression deductive program veriﬁcation to distinguish
this approach from other ways of checking properties of pro-
2grams, such as software model checking [2,19,22]. The goal
of this paper is to apply deductive program veriﬁcation tech-
niques to prove diverse properties of cryptographic software.
Contributions. We describe results obtained in our explo-
ration of existing veriﬁcation techniques and tools (used to
construct high-assurance software implementations in other
domains) to the concrete case of cryptographic software. In
doing so we have also developed techniques that are of in-
dependent interest. Our contributions are the following.
– We propose a composition-based methodology for prov-
ing the functional equivalence of programs. This is in-
spired by the self-composition technique [5] that can be
used to prove information ﬂow properties of programs.
Our methodology also enables self-composition proofs,
although it targets the more general problem of proving
the correctness of concrete implementations with respect
to speciﬁcations given as reference implementations
– We employ natural invariants as a device to establish
a correspondence between (annotation-level) axiomatic
properties of programs and (a formalisation of) their op-
erational semantics. This device take us beyond the usual
scope of contract-based veriﬁcation, enabling us to ob-
tain automatic proofs relying on a battery of lemmas
which are interactively proved once-and-for-all.
– We show how natural invariants are useful for reasoning
about pairs of programs with similar control structures.
In particular, this is a useful technique to enable program
equivalence proofs in practice. It also allows for the au-
tomation of the self-composition technique, which has
been identiﬁed as a major problem [32].
– We show how these results enable us to use an off-the-
shelf veriﬁcation tool to reason about functional correct-
ness, safety properties, and security properties of a C im-
plementation of the RC4 encryption scheme, included in
the well-known open-source library openSSL [29].
CACE (Computer Aided Cryptography Engineering [8]) is
an European Project that targets the lack of support cur-
rently offered to cryptographic software engineers. The cen-
tral objective of the project is the development of a tool-box
of domain-speciﬁc languages, compilers and libraries, that
supports the production of high quality cryptographic soft-
ware. The aim is that speciﬁc components within the tool-
box will address particular software development problems
and processes; and combined use of the constituent tools is
enabled by designed integration between their interfaces. It
is a three-year project that started in 2008.
This article stems from CACE - Work Package 5, which
aims at adding formal methods technology to the tool-box,
as a means to increase the degree of assurance than can be
provided by the development process.
Organisation. Section 2 introduces the area of cryptograph-
ic software implementation, and identiﬁes important secu-
rity properties that deserve attention from a formal veriﬁ-
cation point of view. We then discuss in Section 3 methods
to formalise and verify the validity of these properties us-
ing a deductive veriﬁcation platform. Section 4 describes the
development of an infrastructure to support the automation
of the proposed approach, and Section 5 shows its appli-
cation to a concrete case study: the veriﬁcation of the RC4
openSSL implementation. We conclude the paper with a dis-
cussion of related work in Section 6 and some concluding
remarks in Section 7.
2 A Catalogue of Software Properties
2.1 Functional Correctness
The goal of functional correctness veriﬁcation is to establish
that a program performs according to some intended spec-
iﬁcation. More precisely, that the input/output behaviour of
the implementation matches that of the speciﬁcation. This
is certainly the primary concern in program veriﬁcation and
the context in which the deductive approach has been most
widely used. Verifying functional correctness within a de-
ductive framework typically involves the following steps:
1. annotating the source code with speciﬁcation contracts;
2. adding invariant information for loops (and possibly also
variants if total correctness is a concern);
3. producing, with the help of a veriﬁcation condition gen-
erator tool (VCGen), a set of veriﬁcation conditions; and
4. discharging them (i.e. proving them) using an automatic
or interactive prover.
The critical points are steps 2 and 4, since the user needs
to identify how certain properties are approximated during
the loop execution – this is where most of the user activ-
ity should be focused, since richer invariants will be harder
to prove, but will simplify the veriﬁcation of the contract
(by providing a richer set of hypotheses). Indeed, an active
research area is invariant synthesis, which attempts to au-
tomatically generate these invariants by analysing the pro-
gram. However, it should be kept in mind that the problem
is inherently difﬁcult, even if certain approaches seem to be-
have quite well for speciﬁc domains.
Correctness with respect to a Reference Implementation.
The standard scenario in deductive veriﬁcation is that spec-
iﬁcations are written as contracts on the function and pro-
cedure interfaces. This may involve properties of the output
values (typically written in ﬁrst-order logic), as well as rela-
tions between input and output values.
In this work we take an alternative route. We are inter-
ested in verifying cryptographic software, whose speciﬁca-
tions are typically given as operational descriptions (i.e. as
3algorithms). This is the case, for example, in symmetric-key
techniques such as ciphers, message authentication codes,
cryptographic hash functions, etc. When implementing such
a technique, the programmer will follow this description, but
is free to improve the code, say by introducing optimisations
or internal reorganisations (e.g. to improve efﬁciency, main-
tainability, or to satisfy non-functional security properties),
as long as the input-output behaviour is the same as that pre-
scribed by the speciﬁcation.
To some extent, the speciﬁcation acts as a reference im-
plementation: verifying functional correctness is reduced to
proving program equivalence. Again, this is a difﬁcult (and
undecidable) problem, although in this concrete application
domain we can rely on the fact that implementation and
speciﬁcation share most of their internal structure (since the
latter has been adopted as a model for the former). Indeed,
the sort of equivalence proof required for cryptographic soft-
ware corresponds to what is usually known in software en-
gineering as code refactoring.
2.2 Safety Properties
Due to the inherent difﬁculty of the veriﬁcation of func-
tional properties, less ambitious forms of veriﬁcation are of-
ten used. A widespread veriﬁcation approach which aims
at increasing the level of assurance that can be placed on
software implementations is to conﬁne the analysis to a re-
stricted class of properties that rule out the occurrence of
some recognisable “bad things”. This is what is called a
safety analysis, which often includes properties associated
with common vulnerabilities arising from coding errors such
as de-referencing invalid pointers, accessing containers with
invalid indexes, calculation errors due to overﬂows, etc.
The advantage of focusing on such simple properties is
that a signiﬁcant degree of automation can be achieved, min-
imising user intervention and impact on development time.
The resulting level of assurance, far from being absolute, is
nevertheless sufﬁcient for a wide class of application sce-
narios. In this work, we also brieﬂy review how a deductive
veriﬁcation tool can be used to perform this sort of analysis.
2.3 Information Flow Security
Information ﬂow security refers to a class of security poli-
cies that constrain the ways in which information can be ma-
nipulated during program execution. These properties can
be formulated in terms of non-interference between high-
conﬁdentiality input variables and low-conﬁdentiality out-
put variables, and are usually veriﬁed using a special ex-
tended type system [36,26,3]. A dual formulation permits
capturing security policies that constrain information ﬂow
from non-trustworthy (or low-integrity) inputs, to trusted (or
high-integrity) outputs. In Section 6 we provide an overview
of developments in this area related to the work in this paper.
Consider the more common case of secure information-
ﬂow that aims at preserving data conﬁdentiality. Information
may ﬂow from high-security to low-security variables either
directly via assignment instructions, or indirectly. The fol-
lowing code from Terauchi and Aiken [32] computes in f1
the nth Fibonacci number and then assigns a value to l that
depends on the value of f1.
f1 = 1; f2 = 0;
while (n > 0) {
f1 = f1 + f2;
f2 = f1 - f2;
n--; }
if (f1 > k) l = 1; else l = 0;
Let l be low security and n high security; then clearly there
is an indirect information leakage from n to l, since the as-
signment l = 1 is guarded by a condition that depends on
the value of f1, and assignments to the latter variable are
performed inside a loop that is controlled by the high secu-
rity condition n> 0. The program is thus insecure. If n were
not high security, the program would of course be secure.
Type-based analyses would address the problem by trac-
king assignments to low security variables. Observe, how-
ever, that this fails to capture subtle situations where an ap-
parently insecure program is in fact secure. If the last line of
the program were changed to
if (f1 > k) l = E1; else l = E2;
where E1, E2 are two expressions that evaluate to the same
value, then the program should be classiﬁed as high security,
since there is no way to tell from the ﬁnal value of l anything
about f1. Type-based analyses would typically fail to distin-
guish this from the previous program: both would be conser-
vatively classiﬁed as insecure. An alternative approach is to
deﬁne a program as secure if different terminating execu-
tions, starting from states that differ only in the values of
high-security variables, result in ﬁnal states that are equiv-
alent with respect to the values of low-security variables.
This approach, based on the language semantics, avoids the
excessively conservative behaviour of the previous method.
More formally, let VH and VL denote respectively the
sets of high-security and low-security variables of C, and
V ′L = Vars(C) \ VH . We write (C,σ) ⇓ τ to denote the fact
that when executed in state σ , C stops in state τ (states are
functions mapping variables to values; ⇓ is the evaluation
relation in a big-step semantics of the underlying language).
Then the program C is secure if for arbitrary states σ , τ ,
σ
V ′L= τ ∧ (C,σ) ⇓ σ ′ ∧ (C,τ) ⇓ τ ′ =⇒ σ ′ VL= τ ′
where σ X= τ denotes the fact that σ(x) = τ(x) for all x ∈ X ,
i.e. σ and τ are X-indistinguishable.
4Variants and Other Uses of Non-Interference. Non-interfer-
ence has been recognised to be very strict in the sense that
it excludes any form of information ﬂow between high level
and low level security variables. Most of the times one needs
some mechanism for declassifying data, allowing controlled
ﬂux of information between security levels. In Section 6 we
point to some related work in this direction.
We also point out that non-interference may be useful to
express properties that are not directly concerned with se-
curity, but are nevertheless useful in characterising speciﬁc
aspects of cryptographic algorithms. As an example, con-
sider the error-propagation property of stream ciphers such
as RC4, describing how they behave when used to transfer
data over channels which may introduce transmission errors.
The way in which the decryption process reﬂects a wrong
ciphertext symbol in the resulting plaintext is relevant: de-
pending on the encryption scheme construction, a ciphertext
error may simply lead to a corresponding ﬂip in a plaintext
symbol, or it may affect a signiﬁcant number of subsequent
symbols. This property, sometimes called error propagation,
is usually taken as a criterion for selecting ciphers for noisy
communication media, where the absence of error propaga-
tion can greatly increase throughput. Note that error prop-
agation can sometimes be seen as a desirable feature, as it
ampliﬁes errors that may be introduced maliciously, making
them easier to detect.
The intuition underlying the formalisation of error-prop-
agation with non-interference is that secure information ﬂow
can be guaranteed by checking that arbitrary changes in low-
integrity input variables cannot be detected by observing
high-integrity output variables. We remark that the notion
of a low-integrity input variable can be naturally associated
with a transmission error over a communications channel.
Hence, we map the ith possibly erroneous ciphertext sym-
bol to a non-trusted low-integrity input (we are looking at
the decryption algorithm that, in the case of RC4, is iden-
tical to the one used for encryption). The deﬁnition of non-
interference can then conveniently be used to capture the ab-
sence of error propagation. For this, we associate the output
plaintext symbols starting at position i+ 1 to trusted high-
integrity outputs.
More precisely, our formulation captures the following
idea: if an arbitrary change in the ith input ciphertext symbol
cannot be observed in the output plaintext symbols follow-
ing position i, this implies that the stream cipher does not
introduce error propagation in decryption.
3 Proofs by Composition
In this section we ﬁrst review self-composition, a technique
for proving non-interference based on deductive veriﬁca-
tion, and a generalisation (composition of two programs)
that can be used to prove program equivalences. Our interest
in reasoning about equivalence of programs is motivated by
the notion of “correctness with respect to a reference imple-
mentation”, as explained in Section 2.
The difﬁculties of applying self-composition in practice
are well-known, and they also apply to proofs of equiva-
lence. In Section 3.3 we will introduce the notion of natu-
ral invariant to overcome these difﬁculties. The technique
establishes a correspondence between program annotations
and an underlying formalisation of the operational semantics
of the programs. This allows us to prove (interactively) cer-
tain fundamental lemmas that can be used to automatically
prove properties based on the self-composition or composi-
tion techniques.
3.1 Self-Composition
The operational deﬁnition of non-interference involves two
executions of the program but, using the self-composition
technique [5], it can be reformulated to consider a single
execution (of a transformed program). Given some (deter-
ministic) program C, let Cs be the program that is equal to
C except that every variable x is renamed to a fresh variable
xs. Non-interference can be formulated considering a sin-
gle execution of the self-composed programC;Cs. Note that
any state σ of C;Cs can be partitioned into two states with
disjoint domains σ = σo ∪ σ s where dom(σo) = Vars(C)
and dom(σ s) = {xs|x ∈ Vars(C)}. C is information-ﬂow se-
cure if any terminating execution of the self-composed pro-
gramC;Cs, starting from a state σ such that σo and σ s differ
only in the values of high-security variables, results in a ﬁnal
state σ ′ such that σ ′o and σ ′s are equivalent with respect to
the values of low-security variables. This can be formulated
without referring explicitly to the state partition: if σ(x) =
σ(xs) for all x ∈V ′L and (C;Cs,σ) ⇓ σ ′, then σ ′(x) = σ ′(xs)
for all x ∈VL.
Self-composition allows for a shift from an operational
semantics-based to an axiomatic semantics-based deﬁnition,
since the former can be written as the following Hoare logic
partial correctness speciﬁcation:
{∧





x∈VL x = x
s
}
Difﬁculties of Applying Self-composition. The example of
Section 2.3 would result in the following self-composed pro-
gram F ;Fs.
f1 = 1; f2 = 0;
while (n > 0) {
f1 = f1 + f2; f2 = f1 - f2; n--;
}
if (f1 > k) l = 1; else l = 0;
f1s = 1; f2s = 0;
while (ns > 0) {
5f1s = f1s + f2s; f2s = f1s - f2s; ns--;
}
if (f1s > ks) ls = 1; else ls = 0;
This example was used in previous work by Terauchi
and Aiken [32] to show the difﬁculties of mechanising self-
composition using software model checkers. In order to use
a VCGen, one would annotate the self-composed code with
the contract dictated by the following Hoare triple
{n = ns∧ k = ks∧ l = ls} F ;Fs {l = ls}
together with the obvious control invariants for each loop
(regarding the minimum value of the variables n and ns).
Some of the generated proof-obligations would not how-
ever be discharged by an automatic prover. Admittedly, the
control invariants do not sufﬁciently describe what the loops
do (in particular, the fact that they are calculating Fibonacci
numbers), and for this reason the post-condition cannot be
proved, whether n==ns is included in the precondition (stat-
ing that n is not considered high-security) or not. The ver-
iﬁcation thus fails to recognize a secure program, even for
such an apparently trivial example.
3.2 Equivalence by Composition
The above method can be extended to handle program equi-
valence. Suppose we have two programs C1 and C2, and
that we are interested in proving their equivalence. Let V be
the set of variables occurring in both programs (we assume
both use the same set of variables, otherwise we may let
V = Vars(C1)∩Vars(C2)). The idea that we want to capture
is that if the programs are executed from indistinguishable
states with respect toV , they terminate in states that are also
indistinguishable. C1 and C2 will be deﬁned as equivalent
if every execution of the composed program C1;Cs2, starting
from a state in which the values of corresponding variables
are equal, terminates in a state with the same property. This




x∈V x = xs]C1;Cs2 [
∧
x∈V x = xs]
Weaker notions of equivalence can be handled by taking V
to be a subset of Vars(C1)∩ Vars(C2). In fact, we are not
restricted to equivalence relations – arbitrary relations can
be considered between the two partitions of the state:
[R1(σ ,σ s)]C1;Cs2 [R2(σ ,σ
s)]
where σ and σ s denote the state partitions associated with
C1 and Cs2 respectively.
The veriﬁcation of such assertions leads to similar difﬁ-
culties to those already mentioned for self-composition: in
general there is no means to relate the outcomes of both
programs, and automatic veriﬁcation fails. This was to be
expected, since establishing program equivalence is in gen-
eral as undecidable problem.
3.3 Natural Invariants
In both scenarios identiﬁed above, the most evident difﬁ-
culty of carrying out the veriﬁcation comes from the absence
of appropriate loop invariants. Of course, after ﬁnding these
loop invariants we still need to establish the intended proper-
ties (ideally, with reasonable levels of automation). In what
follows we propose a general approach to this problem. In
short, it consists of the following steps:
1. Extracting a speciﬁcation of each program from its re-
lational semantics. We focus on the critical point of the
veriﬁcation process, which is the construction of appro-
priate loop invariants, and propose to construct them au-
tomatically. The invariants we extract constitute the nat-
ural speciﬁcation of each program, guaranteed to be sat-
isﬁed by it. Each invariant is named and turned into an
predicate, which is then used to annotate the correspond-
ing loop in the source code.
2. Identifying and interactively proving additional facts in-
volving the named invariant predicates. The critical ob-
servation is that such lemmas correspond to basic refac-
toring steps that are recurrently used in the development
of cryptographic software. Their purpose is to relate the
speciﬁcations of the composed programs, capturing the
non-trivial parts of the proofs required for veriﬁcation.
3. Augmenting the source ﬁle with the previous facts (writ-
ten as lemmas), which have been justiﬁed once-and-for-
all by interactive proofs. The availability of these lem-
mas will allow automatic provers to carry out the ver-
iﬁcation process, validating the veriﬁcation conditions
generated by a potentially large number of (self-) com-
position proofs.
We recall that we are primarily interested in tackling self-
composition, as well as program equivalences when both
programs share much of the underlying control structure.
This makes it reasonable to assume that the user may easily
guide the interactive veriﬁcation process by providing hints
regarding the exploited code refactorings. This will allow
them to take advantage of the high degree of automation
that can be deployed to handle the remaining parts of the
veriﬁcation process.
Relational Speciﬁcation. For concreteness, we consider a
simple While language with integer expressions and arrays.
Its syntax is given by:
P ::= {P} | skip | P1;P2
|V := Eint | A[Eint ] := Eint
| if (Ebool) then P1 else P2
| while (Ebool) P
Eint ::= Constint | Eint op Eint | A[Eint ] op ∈ {+,−,∗,/, ...}
Ebool ::= true | false | ¬Ebool | Ebool ∧Ebool | Ebool ∨Ebool
| Eint opRel Eint opRel ∈ {=,<,>, ...}
6We do not adopt any form of variable declaration. Instead,
we consider a ﬁxed State type that keeps track of all the
variable values during the execution of the program. Integer
variables are interpreted as (unbound) integers, and arrays
as functions from integers to integers (no size / range check-
ing). Array operations are axiomatised as usual:
acc : (Z → Z)×Z → Z
upd : (Z → Z)×Z×Z → (Z → Z)
acc(upd(a,k,x),k) = x
acc(upd(a,k′,x),k) = acc(a,k) if k = k′.
The State type is deﬁned as the cartesian product of the
corresponding interpretation domains (each variable is asso-
ciated to a particular position). We also consider an equiva-
lence relation ≡ that captures equality on states. Integer and
boolean expressions are interpreted in a particular state, that
is [[eInt ]] : State→ Z, [[eBool ]] : State→ B. We take the stan-
dard deﬁnition for the big-step semantics of a program as its
natural speciﬁcation. For states σ and σ ′ we deﬁne:
specskip(σ ,σ ′) = σ ≡ σ ′
spec{P}(σ ,σ ′) = specP(σ ,σ ′)
specP1;P2 (σ ,σ
′) = ∃σ ′′, specP1 (σ ,σ ′′)∧ specP2 (σ ′′,σ ′)
specv:=E(σ ,σ ′) = σ ′ ≡ σ{v← [[E]](σ)}
speca[E1]=E2 (σ ,σ
′) = σ ′ ≡ σ{a← upd(a, [[E1]](σ), [[E2]](σ))}
specif C then P1 else P2 (σ ,σ
′) = ([[C]]σ ∧ specP1 (σ ,σ ′))∨
(¬[[C]]σ ∧ specP2 (σ ,σ ′))
specwhile (C) P(σ ,σ ′) = ∃n, loopnC,specP(σ ,σ ′)(σ ,σ
′)∧¬[[C]](σ ′)
where loopnC,R(σ ,σ
′) is the inductively deﬁned relation
loop0C,R(σ ,σ




′)⇐= ∃σ ′′, loopnC,R(σ ,σ ′′)∧ [[C]](σ ′′)∧R(σ ′′,σ ′)
The relation loopnC,R(σ ,σ
′) denotes the loop speciﬁcation
for the body R under condition C. We call such a relation
the natural invariant for the loop (strictly speaking, this is
in fact a relation that provides a natural choice for a loop’s
invariant). In this deﬁnition we have made explicit the it-
eration rank (iteration count) in superscript – in fact, we
will see that it is often convenient to consider it explicitly
in the proofs. Nevertheless, when omitted, it should be con-
sidered as existentially quantiﬁed. Also, we will omit sub-
scripts (both in loop and spec) when the corresponding pro-
grams are clear from the context.
Expressiveness and Relative Completeness. Natural invari-
ants capture the input-output relational semantics of pro-
grams at the logical level. Naturally, they depend on a sufﬁ-
ciently expressive assertion language, as it should allow for
the deﬁnition of new inductive relations. This corresponds
essentially to Cook’s expressiveness criteria in his relative
completeness result for Hoare Logic [12]. In fact, from nat-
ural invariants we can easily recover the strongest liberal
predicate as
slp(S,P) = {σ ′ | P(σ)∧ specS(σ ,σ ′)}
An immediate consequence is that the veriﬁcation of an ar-
bitrary Hoare triple could be conducted logically, as follows
{P}S{Q} iff slp(S,P)⊇ Q
iff ∀σσ ′, P(σ)∧ specS(σ ,σ ′)⇒ Q(σ ′).
However, we note that the presence of loops immediately
forces the use of full-ﬂedged inductive reasoning, compro-
mising the aim of relying on automatic provers to conduct
signiﬁcant parts of the proof. We will thus conﬁne such a
general use of induction to general lemmas that will justify
speciﬁc program transformations (refactorings).
Verifying Trivial Equivalences. Let us focus for a moment
on the veriﬁcation of the trivial equivalence by self-compo-
sition (any program is equivalent to itself). By construction,
spec enjoys the following properties.
Lemma 1 Let R(σ ,σ ′) be a deterministic relation on states,
and C a boolean condition. Then, loopC,R(σ ,σ ′) is deter-
ministic whenever ¬[[C]](σ ′), i.e.
loop synchronisation: ∀n1 n2 σ1 σ2 σ ′1 σ ′2,
σ1 ≡ σ2∧ loopn1C,R(σ1,σ ′1)∧¬[[C]](σ ′1)∧ loopn2C,R(σ2,σ ′2)∧¬[[C]](σ ′2)
=⇒ n1 = n2;
loop determinism: ∀n σ1 σ2 σ ′1 σ ′2,
σ1 ≡ σ2∧ loopnC,R(σ ,σ ′1)∧ loopnC,R(σ ,σ ′2) =⇒ σ ′1 ≡ σ ′2.
Proof Both statements are proved by a simple induction (on
max(n1,n2) in the ﬁrst case, and n in the second). unionsq




– spec is a morphism that preserves ≡. More precisely, if
σ1 ≡ σ2, σ ′1 ≡ σ ′2 and specP(σ1,σ ′1) then specP(σ2,σ ′2).
– spec is deterministic. More precisely, if specP(σ ,σ ′1) and
specP(σ ,σ ′2) then σ
′
1 ≡ σ ′2.
Proof By induction on the structure of P using Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 enables a fully automatic proof of equivalence
of the self-composed program: it can be proved once-and-
for-all and then included in the annotations provided to the
veriﬁcation platform, allowing all other proof obligations to
be discharged. Indeed, our strategy for reasoning about mul-
tiple executions of the same (or related) program(s) is based
on this observation: it is possible to identify a set of general
lemmas that can be proven once-and-for-all, and that allow
us to reason about self-composition assertions or to justify
interesting refactorings (e.g. loop refactorings).
7Self-composition Lemmas. The determinism property is not
relevant to reason about a non-interference property by self-
composition: it merely states that the two instances of the
program will produce the same outputs when all of their in-
puts are equal. What is needed is a rephrasing of that prop-
erty using an equality relation on low-security variables. If
the control structure of the program does not depend on
high-security variables, the determinism property proof can
be carried over to non-interference lemmas. More explicitly,
we recast each loop synchronisation lemma as follows
∀n1 n2 σ1 σ2 σ ′1 σ ′2,
πC(σ1)≡ πC(σ2)∧ loopn1C,R(σ1,σ ′1)
∧¬[[C]](σ ′1)∧ loopn2C,R(σ2,σ ′2)∧¬[[C]](σ ′2) =⇒ n1 = n2
where πC projects the fragment of the state that inﬂuences
the control state (i.e. the loop conditions) – note that this can
be obtained by a simple (syntactical) dependency analysis
that collects all variables accessed by C and all variables
that may interfere on the values of the latter through the loop
body. Then, a non-interference result for each loop follows
easily from non-interference in its body:
(∀σ1,σ2,σ ′1,σ ′2, σ1 ≡L σ2∧R(σ1,σ ′1)∧R(σ2,σ ′2)⇒ σ ′1 ≡L σ ′2)
⇒ ∀σ1,σ2,σ ′1,σ ′2, σ1 ≡L σ2∧ loopn1C,R(σ1,σ ′1)∧¬[[C]](σ ′1)
∧ loopn2C,R(σ2,σ ′2)∧¬[[C]](σ ′2)⇒ σ ′1 ≡L σ ′2
We observe that proving non-interference for loop-free pro-
grams by self-composition can be easily automated. The pre-
condition for this lemma can be seen as an additional proof-
obligation that must be veriﬁed.
Justifying Loop Refactorings. The main difﬁculty of justify-
ing code refactorings comes up when the refactorings affect
loops. For the sake of presentation, we restrict our attention
to speciﬁcations obtained from single loops with loop-free
bodies. That is, we consider natural invariants of the form
loopC,spec(P)(σ ,σ ′) where P contains no loops. This case is
sufﬁcient to cover the program refactorings needed for es-
tablishing correctness of the RC4 openSSL implementation
addressed in Section 5.
The simplest loop refactoring that can be addressed us-
ing our technique is loop unrolling, in which we detach in-
stances of the loop body. This sort of transformation is justi-
ﬁed by the following property that results from direct inver-
sion of the deﬁnition of loop:




′) =⇒∃σ ′′, loopnC,R(σ ,σ ′′)∧ [[C]](σ ′′)∧R(σ ′′,σ ′).
or, in iterated form:
∀n n′ σ σ ′,
loopn(σ ,σ ′1)∧n′ < n =⇒∃σ ′′, loopn′ (σ ,σ ′′)∧ loopn−n′ (σ ′′,σ ′).
Simple transformations like these are in fact better handled
directly at the annotation level, rather than through explicit
lemmas. Let us illustrate this by a small example that mim-
ics an optimising transformation for the real-world example
presented in Section 5. Consider the program
i := 0;
while (i<N) {
x := x + y;
i := i + 1
}
To implement it, the programmer chooses to unfold two co-
pies of the original loop body in each iteration, yielding
N2 := N/2;
i := 0;
if (i<N2) then {
while (i<N2) {
x := x + y;
x := x + y;
i := i + 1
};
if (2*N2 <> N) then x := x + y else skip
}
else skip
To verify the equivalence between this implementation and
the original program it sufﬁces to identify the second loop
invariant in the second program as the following,
loop2∗i(\old(x,y, i∗2),(x,y, i∗2))
where \old(x) evaluates x in the pre-state of the loop, and
loop(−) refers to the natural invariant of the loop in the ﬁrst
program. By providing the invariant, we are making explicit
the correspondence between both loop executions. This kind
of guidance is reasonable to expect from someone intending
to prove correctness of the target implementation.
Alternatively, one could establish that both programs are
equivalent using direct logical arguments, as will now be
explained. This would be the only option for more complex
refactorings.
General Loop Fusions. To justify more signiﬁcant code re-
factorings such as loop fusions (i.e. combining the bodies of
two consecutive loops with the same control structure), we
need to rely on an explicit lemma. Consider the equivalence
between two consecutive loops (loops 1 and 2) and one sin-
gle fused loop (loop 3). This is reminiscent of another real-
world code refactoring that will occur in our case-study in
Section 5.
Let us denote the natural invariants of these loops by
loop1, loop2 and loop3, respectively. Since we assume that
8all the loops share the same control structure (loop condition
and associated state), it is possible to prove mixed synchro-
nisation lemmas such as
∀n1 n2 σ1 σ2 σ ′1 σ ′2,
πC(σ1)≡ πC(σ2)∧ loopn11 (σ1,σ ′1)∧¬[[C]](σ ′1)
∧ loopn22 (σ2,σ ′2)∧¬[[C]](σ ′2) =⇒ n1 = n2.
The proof is a straightforward generalisation of the single
loop version. Once this result has been established, one can
prove the following main lemma that can be used to justify
the fusion refactoring:
∀n σ1 σ2 σ ′1 σ ′′1 σ ′2,
BodyFusion(body1,body2,body3)∧BodySwap(body1,body2)⇒
σ1 ≡ σ2∧ loopn1(σ1,σ ′′1 )∧ loopn2(σ ′′1 ,σ ′1)∧ loopn3(σ2,σ ′2)
=⇒ σ ′1 ≡ σ ′2,
where
BodyFusion(R1,R2,R3) = ∀k, Rk3 ≡ (Rk2 ◦Rk1)





BodyFusion and BodySwap denote simple properties con-
cerning the loop bodies which, as was the case with the self-
composition lemmas, are all non-recursive and can thus be
regarded as additional proof-obligations, easily discharged
by automatic provers.
4 Veriﬁcation Infrastructure
In this work, we have used Frama-c [6], a tool for the static
analysis of C programs that contains a multi-prover veriﬁ-
cation condition generator [18]. We also employed a set of
proof tools that included the Coq proof assistant [33], and
the Simplify [15], Alt-Ergo [11], and Z3 [13] automatic
theorem provers. C programs are annotated using the ANSI-
C Speciﬁcation Language (ACSL [6]). Both Frama-c and
ACSL are work in progress; we have used the Lithium re-
lease of Frama-c.
Frama-c contains the gwhy graphical front-end that al-
lows to monitor individual veriﬁcation conditions. This is
particularly useful when combined with the possibility of
exporting the conditions to various proof tools, which allows
users to ﬁrst try discharging conditions with one or more au-
tomatic provers, leaving the harder conditions to be studied
with the help of an interactive proof assistant. An additional
feature of Frama-c that we have found useful is the declara-
tion of Lemmas. Like axioms, lemmas can be used to prove
goals, but unlike axioms, which require no proof, lemmas
originate themselves new goals. In the proofs we developed,
it was often the case that once an appropriate lemma was
provided (and proved interactively with Coq), all the veriﬁ-
cation conditions could be automatically discharged.
In this section we describe our use of these tools to sup-
port the approach proposed in Section 3.
4.1 Speciﬁcation Generation
The ﬁrst step is to extract a relational speciﬁcation from the
program code. This process proceeds by recursion on the
program structure (Section 3.3) and produces the speciﬁca-
tion as a logical formula.
In practice, it is convenient to produce the intended for-
mula in prenex-form. This is easily accommodated introduc-
ing new fresh state variables in each elementary statement:
specS1;S2;...;Sn (x1,x2) = ∃w0 . . .wn,
w0 = x1∧w1 = PS1 (w0)∧ . . .∧wn = PSn (wn−1)∧ x2 = wn
where PS(σ) is the atomic state transformation associated
with statement S. The extracted speciﬁcation is then used
according to the proof goal factoring method described in
the previous section:
1. It is encoded in the Coq proof assistant to provide the
context in which the required speciﬁc lemmas can sub-
sequently be proved interactively;
2. It is included as ACSL loop invariant annotations in the
C source code, to be fed to the Frama-c VCGen. For
each loop speciﬁcation the corresponding invariant is in-
cluded in the ACSL code. In this step the lemmas proved
in step 1 are also provided as ACSL lemmas in the an-
notated code, which should allow the remaining proof
goals to be discharged automatically.
In the case study presented in Section 5 the speciﬁcation was
extracted by hand (see Appendix B), but we remark that the
process is certainly amenable to mechanisation. Such a spec-
iﬁcation extraction tool will be developed for the domain-
speciﬁc crypto language CAO [17] as a deliverable of the
CACE project.
The Coq proofs mentioned in the ﬁrst step above are
constructed with support from a library that will now be de-
scribed. Section 4.3 describes the second step above in more
detail.
4.2 Coq Library
A Coq library was developed to support the proof of lemmas
such as those introduced in Section 3. The library consists
of several layers:
9– Frama-c interface, which includes the logical theory ex-
ported by Frama-c and basic deﬁnitions/facts for rea-
soning with the theory inside Coq;
– Basic loop support, for basic treatment of loops (deriva-
tion of determinism and synchronisation lemmas);
– Refactoring lemmas: derivation of self-composition lem-
mas and loop-fusion lemmas;
– Demos and applications, which includes the RC4 exam-
ple discussed in Section 5.
We have made extensive use of Coq’s module system [9]
in order to structure the development. As a rule, we embed
each lemma and respective proof in a functor parameterised
by basic facts it depends on. Concretely, we have deﬁned the
following.
– BuildLoopFun: functor that builds the inductive deﬁ-
nitions for loops and derives the corresponding deter-
minism lemmas. It is parameterised by two modules de-
scribing the loop state (the portion that affects the loop
condition and its complement) and the speciﬁcation of
the loop body. These modules deﬁne the intended exten-
sional equivalence on states and assert the determinism
of the loop-body relation.
– BuildSyncFun: functor that establishes the synchroni-
sation of two loops that share the same boolean condi-
tion. It is used, in particular, to derive a self-synchroni-
sation lemma for each loop.
– BuildSelfComp: generates and proves the self-compo-
sition lemma. It is parameterised by the self-composi-
tion property and the proof that the loop body satisﬁes
that property.
– BuildFusionFun: generates and proves the fusion lem-
ma for two loops. This accepts the description of three
loops (the loops to be fused and the resulting loop) to-
gether with the following properties:
– body-fusion property – asserts that the body of the
third loop behaves as the composition of the bodies
of the ﬁrst two loops;
– body-shift property – asserts that iteration k of the
ﬁrst loop commutes with any of the ﬁrst k−1 itera-
tions of the second loop.
Note that all the results needed as inputs for the func-
tors are non-recursive (they concern the loop body only) and
can be expected to be proved successfully by an automatic
prover.
4.3 Frama-c Usage
Frama-c takes as input annotated C programs in the form
of ACSL ﬁles. In particular, loop invariants are mandatory
for the veriﬁcation to succeed. This means that in order to
verify a property by composition, it is not enough to prop-
erly construct the composed program and to specify the in-
tended contract (pre- and post-conditions) – this would cer-
tainly generate unprovable veriﬁcation conditions. It is also
required to complement the ACSL ﬁle with deﬁnitions and
annotations. The following steps detail the procedure needed
to perform the veriﬁcation:
1. Including ACSL deﬁnitions corresponding to the induc-
tive properties associated to each loop (see Section 4.1);
2. For each loop speciﬁcation, annotating the program with
a loop-invariant of the form
Invloop(σ) = loopC,R(σ@Init,σ)
where C and R are the loop’s condition and body, and
σ@Init denotes the snapshot of the loop’s initial state
(Frama-c supports this notion through the use of ex-
plicit state labels in annotations).
3. Augmenting the ACSL ﬁle with speciﬁc lemmas (proved
in Coq with the support of the library of Section 4.2);
4. Generating proof obligations with Frama-c;
5. Using an automatic prover (e.g. Simplify) to discard the
generated obligations.
The choice of the required lemma is based on the speciﬁc
property under scrutiny (e.g. a self-composition lemma for
a non-interference property). We remark that this user-de-
pendent choice is an important ingredient for the success of
the veriﬁcation process. The goal of our method is to allow
the user to concentrate on this critical part of the veriﬁcation
process by providing assistance in dealing with the remain-
ing tasks, which are tedious but luckily prone to automation.
5 Case Study: openSSL implementation of RC4
RC4 is a symmetric cipher designed by Ron Rivest at RSA
labs in 1987. It is a proprietary algorithm, and its deﬁnition
was never ofﬁcially released. Source code that allegedly im-
plements the RC4 cipher was leaked on the Internet in 1994,
and this is commonly known as ARC4 due to trademark re-
strictions. In this work we will use the RC4 denomination
to denote the deﬁnition adopted in literature [31]. RC4 is
widely used in commercial products, as it is included as one
of the recommended encryption schemes in standards such
as TLS, WEP and WPA. In particular, an implementation of
RC4 is provided in the pervasively used open-source library
openSSL, which we selected as the case study for this paper.
In cryptographic terms, RC4 is a synchronous stream
cipher, which means that it is structured as two indepen-
dent blocks, as shown in Figure 1. The security of the RC4
cipher resides in the strength of the key stream generator,
which is initialized with a secret key SK. The key stream








Fig. 1 Block diagram of the RC4 cipher
random bit string, and is independent of plaintext and ci-
phertext (we adopt the most widely used version of RC4,
implemented in openSSL, which operates over byte-sized
words). The encryption operation consists simply of XOR-
ing each plaintext byte xt with a fresh key stream byte kt . De-
cryption operates in an identical way. The key stream gen-
erator operates over a state which includes a permutation ta-
ble S = (S[l])l=255l=0 of (unsigned) byte-sized values, and two
(unsigned) byte-sized indices i and j. We denote the values
of these variables at time t by St , it and jt . The state and
output of the key stream generator at time t (for t ≥ 1) are
calculated according to the following recurrence, in which
all additions are carried out modulo 256.
it = it−1 +1
jt = jt−1 +St−1[it ]
St [it ] = St−1[ jt ]
St [ jt ] = St−1[it ]
kt = St [St [it ]+St [ jt ]]
The initial values of the indices i0 and j0 are set to 0, and the
initial value of the permutation table S0 is derived from the
secret key SK. The details of this initialisation are immate-
rial for the purpose of this paper, as they are excluded from
the analysis.
We present in Appendix A the C implementation of RC4
included in the openSSL open-source. The function receives
the current state of the RC4 key stream generator (key), and
two arrays whose length is provided in parameter len. The
ﬁrst array contains the plaintext (indata), and the second
array will be used to return the ciphertext (outdata). The
same function can be used for decryption by providing the
ciphertext in the indata buffer. We note that this implemen-
tation is much less readable than the concise description pro-
vided above, as it has been optimised for speed using various
tricks, including macro inlining and loop unrolling. In the
rest of this section we brieﬂy present the veriﬁcation activi-
ties performed on this case-study. Full details of it, including
all the annotated source ﬁles used, can be found in [1].
5.1 Veriﬁcation of Safety Properties
The Frama-c VCGen allows users to perform a safety anal-
ysis of C code, which may be run independently of func-
tional veriﬁcation (see Section 2.2). This produces a special
class of veriﬁcation conditions (called safety conditions) that
are not generated from contracts. Their validity implies that
the program will execute safely with respect to a restricted
set of common programming errors that may result in incor-
rect or unreliable implementations, or even with respect to
security vulnerabilities. These comprise memory safety, in-
cluding the absence of buffer overﬂows, and also absence of
numeric errors due to overﬂows in integer calculations.
Note that, even though the proof obligations generated
for the safety analysis do not result from explicit assertions
made by the programmer, it is usually necessary to anno-
tate the code with preconditions that permit justifying the
proof goals. These preconditions limit the analysis to func-
tion executions for which the caller has provided valid in-
puts. For example, in RC4 one must assume that the indata
and outdata arrays have a valid addressable range between
0 and len-1 for the safety conditions to be valid. The inclu-
sion of simple loop invariants to enable reasoning about the
program state before, during and after each loop execution
is also required. Finally, and given that cryptographic code
tends to make use of some arithmetic operators that are not
commonly used in other application domains, we noted that
Frama-c lacked appropriate support in some cases, namely
for bit-wise operators. To overcome this difﬁculty we added
some very simple axioms to the annotated RC4 code.
Running the Frama-c VCGen on the annotated source
code RC4 gave rise to 869 veriﬁcation conditions. All of
these were automatically discharged using a set of automatic
provers that included Simplify, Alt-Ergo, and Z3.
5.2 Error-propagation Property
We have used the self-composition technique described in
Section 2.3 to verify whether the RC4 implementation in
openSSL indeed satisﬁes a property which is common to all
synchronous stream ciphers: the absence of error propaga-
tion. Recall that this amounts to verifying that an erroneous
(possibly tampered) input symbol, which will unavoidably
result in a corresponding erroneous output symbol in the
same position, will not affect subsequent outputs. Formally,
following the notation introduced in Section 2.3 that asso-
ciates VH with the set of low-integrity input variables and
VL with the set of high-integrity outputs, we have for some
i ∈ [0, len[:
VH = {indata[i]},
VL = {outdata[ j] | i < j < len}.
We have extracted natural invariants from the code and
annotated the source ﬁle according to the procedure pre-
sented in Section 4. The veriﬁcation with Frama-c resulted
in the generation of 17 proof obligations, all of which were
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void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, const unsigned long len,
const unsigned char *indata,
unsigned char *outdata) {
int i=0;
while(i<len) {




Fig. 2 RC4 reference implementation
automatically discharged by Simplify. This was made pos-
sible by the inclusion of a helper lemma in the ACSL annota-
tions (proved ofﬂine in Coq by instantiating the appropriate
functor from the developed library).
5.3 Correctness of RC4 Openssl Implementation
A direct transcription to a C implementation of the RC4
speciﬁcation presented at the beginning of this section could
look something like the code in Figure 2. Although this im-
plementation is quite readable, and arguably veriﬁable by
inspection, it was created without the slightest consideration
for efﬁciency. This stands in contrast with the openSSL im-
plementation of RC4 (see Appendix A) where readability
(and the inherent assurance of correctness) was sacriﬁced to
achieve better performance.
This example supports the domain-speciﬁc motivation
for the discussion presented in this section: the natural way
to obtain assurance that an implementation of a cryptogra-
phic algorithm is correct is to verify that it is functionally
equivalent to another (more readable) implementation of the
same algorithm. We have investigated how this goal can be
achieved for the particular case of RC4, by identifying refac-
toring steps that may require a proof of equivalence in order
to establish the correctness of different implementations.
A simple refactoring to capture key pre-processing. The ﬁrst
example we present of a possible refactoring of the RC4
speciﬁcation in Figure 2 is suggested by a common opti-
misation performed when using stream ciphers. Indeed, one
of the ways to speed up the throughput of stream cipher pro-
cessing is to compute (a portion of) the key stream before the
plaintext is available (or the ciphertext if one is decrypting).
This means that the encryption operation to be performed
void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, const unsigned long len,















Fig. 3 RC4 implementation with key pre-processing
on-the-ﬂy is then reduced to simple masking using an XOR
operation, which can be done extremely fast.
For synchronous ciphers such as RC4, the number of
bits in the key stream that can be pre-computed can be arbi-
trarily large, as this is totally independent of the encrypted
data. The version of RC4 shown in Figure 3 moves in this
direction by separating the key stream generation process
from the plaintext masking (or ciphertext unmasking) pro-
cess. This is an instance of the loop-fusion refactoring of
Section 3.3. The infrastructure described in Section 4 was
used to prove equivalence beween the programs in Figures 2
and 3. Appendix B shows an example of how the deductive
veriﬁcation tool is interfaced in this case.
A sequence of refactorings leading to the openssl imple-
mentation. We discuss a more elaborate sequence of refac-
toring steps that permit reaching the openSSL implementa-
tion of RC4 in Appendix A, departing from the reference
implementation in Figure 2. The ﬁrst refactoring step, lead-
ing to the RC4 function in Figure 4, top, is not very interest-
ing from a veriﬁcation point of view. It consists of a number
of simple transformations: (1) removing the auxiliary func-
tion by inlining the corresponding code in the main function
body; (2) rearranging local variables to match those in the
openSSL implementation; (3) applying the transitivity prop-
erty of assignments in C to combine two statements; and (4)
replacing modular operations by equivalent bit-wise opera-
tions. A macro is also introduced to improve readability.
The next refactoring steps, leading to the version shown
in Figure 4, bottom, are more interesting examples of trans-
formations involving loop refactorings. Concretely, the main
loop is ﬁrst separated into two loops with the same body,
which are sequentially composed to realise the original num-
ber of iterations. The ﬁrst loop is then modiﬁed by explicitly
composing the original body with itself 8 times, and altering
the increments accordingly.
12
void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, const unsigned long len,
const unsigned char *indata,
unsigned char *outdata)
{
unsigned char x,y,tx,ty, *d;
int i;
x = key->x; y = key->y; d = key-> data;
i=0;
while(i<len) { RC4LOOP(indata,outdata,i); i++; }
key->x=x; key->y=y;
}
void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, const unsigned long len,
const unsigned char *indata,
unsigned char *outdata)
{
unsigned char x,y,tx,ty, *d;
int i;














while(i>0) {RC4LOOP(indata,outdata,i); i--; }
key->x=x; key->y=y;
}
Fig. 4 RC4 refactoring steps 1 (top) and 2 (bottom).
The ﬁnal refactoring steps, leading to the openssl ver-
sion of RC4 in Appendix A, are introduced to achieve ad-
ditional speed-ups. Firstly, pointer arithmetic is used to re-
duce the range of indexing operations, and loop counting
is inverted. Then, different control ﬂow constructions are
applied: all while loops are reformulated using the break
statement to remove the ﬁnal backward jump, and if con-
structions are introduced to detect termination cases. Equiv-
alence checking for these low-level refactorings was per-
formed directly in Frama-c.
6 Related Work
A good survey of language-based information ﬂow security
can be found in [30]. A good general view of self-composi-
tion can be found in [10]. Information ﬂow policies were
ﬁrst introduced by Denning et. al [14] and tend to be for-
malised as noninterference properties. Information ﬂow type
systems, have been used to enforce noninterference in differ-
ent contexts [36,27,26,34,35]. The main challenge in de-
signing these systems is that they are often too conservative
in practice, so that secure programs may be rejected. Leino
and Joshi [24] were the ﬁrst to propose a semantic approach
to checking secure information ﬂow, with several desirable
features: a more precise characterisation of security; it ap-
plies to all programming constructs whose semantics are
well-deﬁned; and it can be used to reason about indirect in-
formation leakage through variations in program behaviour
(e.g., whether or not the program terminates). An attempt to
capture this property in program logics using the Java Mod-
elling Language (JML) [23] was presented by Warnier et
al. [37], who proposed an algorithm, based on the strongest
postcondition calculus, that generates an annotated source
ﬁle with speciﬁcation patterns for conﬁdentiality in JML.
Dufay et al. [16] have proposed an extension to JML to
enforce non-interference through self-composition. This ex-
tended annotation language allows for a simple deﬁnition of
non-interference for Java programs. However, the generated
proof obligations are complex, which limits the general ap-
plicability of the approach.
Terauchi and Aiken [32] identiﬁed problems in the self-
composition approach, arguing that automatic tools (soft-
ware model checkers like SLAM [2] and BLAST [19]) are
not powerful enough to verify this property over programs of
realistic size. To compensate for this, the authors propose a
program transformation technique for an extended version
of the self-composition approach. Rather than replicating
the original code, the renamed version is interleaved and
partially merged with it. Naumann[28] extended Terauchi
and Aiken’s work to encompass heap objects, presented a
systematic method to validate the transformations proposed
in [32], and reported on the experience of using these tech-
niques with the Spec# [4] and ESC/JAVA2 [21] tools.
Natural Invariants provide an explicit rendition of pro-
gram semantics. In [25] a similar encoding of program se-
mantics in logical form can be found, which advocates the
use of second-order logic as appropriate to reason about pro-
grams, since it allows to capture the inductive nature of the
input-output relations for iterative programs. To some ex-
tent, our use of Coq’s higher-order logic may be seen as an
endorsement of that view. However, we have made an ef-
fort to combine the strengths of higher-order logic reasoning
with facilities provided by automatic ﬁrst-order provers.
Relational Hoare Logic [7] has been used to prove the
soundness of program analyses and optimising transforma-
tions. Its scope is thus similar to our proofs-by-composition
setting. The main difference is the fact that we do not need
to move away from traditional Hoare Logic, which allows
us to rely on standard available veriﬁcation tools.
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7 Conclusion
We have used an off-the-shelf veriﬁcation platform to check
several classes of properties of a real-world example of a
cryptographic software implementation: the widely used C
implementation of the RC4 stream cipher available in the
openSSL library. Our results focus on three security-relevant
properties of this implementation, with increasing degrees
of veriﬁcation complexity: (1) safety properties such as the
absence of numeric errors and memory safety; (2) absence
of error propagation formalised as non-interference; and (3)
functional equivalence with respect to a reference imple-
mentation.
In more concrete terms, we have used Frama-c to prove
that the RC4 implementation does not cause null pointer de-
referencing exceptions, and always performs array accesses
with valid indices. In other words, the implementation is
secure against buffer overﬂow attacks. Additionally, we de-
monstrated that the limited ranges of numeric variables used
in the RC4 implementation are guaranteed not to introduce
calculation errors for particular input values.
An important property of stream ciphers such as RC4 is
their behaviour when a bit in the ciphertext is ﬂipped over a
communication channel. The behaviour of RC4 is common
to other synchronous ciphers: bit errors are not propagated
in any way, i.e. if a ciphertext bit is ﬂipped during transmis-
sion, then only the corresponding plaintext bit is affected.
We have formalised this property as a novel application of
the non-interference concept, widely used in the formalisa-
tion and veriﬁcation of secure information ﬂow properties,
and subsequently proved that the RC4 implementation in-
deed enjoys this property.
Finally, we have also shown how the method introduced
to prove non-interference can be applied to the more gen-
eral case of equivalence proofs, to prove the correctness of
real implementations with respect to reference implemen-
tations. Cryptography is a prime candidate for equivalence
proofs, since speciﬁcations are usually given as reference
implementations rather then using some high level model or
language. In concrete terms we have proved the equivalence
between a reference implementation of RC4 and the realistic
implementation included in openSSL.
Program equivalences are difﬁcult veriﬁcation challen-
ges by nature, and automatic proof is of little help. Resort-
ing to an interactive proof tool to conduct inductive proofs
involving loops is inevitable. Our approach can be summed
up as follows
1. Program equivalences in general can be expressed as
Hoare triples using a composition technique that simu-
lates the execution of two programs by a single program.
Such triples can be written in an interface speciﬁcation
language like ACSL and fed to a standard VCGen like
Frama-c.
2. Natural invariants are good candidates for establishing
the connection between the interface speciﬁcation lan-
guage and the proof assistant: the ACSL speciﬁcation
language admits inductively deﬁned predicates, thus the
natural invariants annotated into the speciﬁcation ﬁles
(fed to the VCGen) can make use of them, and lemmas
can also be included in these ﬁles, to be (i) used by au-
tomatic provers and (ii) exported to Coq for interactive
proof. These predicates / invariants (and some standard
lemmas) can be generated mechanically. Note that since
the typical ﬁrst-order prover does not support inductive
predicates, Frama-c will replace them by uninterpreted
predicates in the veriﬁcation conditions generated for
these provers (with axioms corresponding to the inter-
actively proved properties). This allows to capture the
program semantics through purely ﬁrst-order assertions.
3. Concluding the veriﬁcation process is then a matter of
establishing and proving interactively a small number
of adequate lemmas that concentrate the more creative
parts of the proofs required in the veriﬁcation process.
To assist users in this more demanding task, we have de-
veloped a dedicated Coq library. Once a lemma has been
proved in Coq and annotated into the composed speciﬁ-
cation of the refactoring step, all the proof obligations
generated by Frama-c are discharged automatically.
In addition to showing that deductive veriﬁcation meth-
ods are increasingly more amenable to practical use with
reasonable degrees of automation, our work answers some
open questions raised by previous work, which seemed to
indicate that proofs by (self-)composition were not directly
applicable in real-world situations. Our results are promis-
ing in that we have been able to achieve our goal using only
off-the-shelf veriﬁcation tools.
What is more, we believe that our technique has a high
potential for mechanisation. For instance, it is likely that the
procedure referred in Section 4.3 may itself be partially au-
tomated. Speculating a bit, it is conceivable to extend ACSL
with constructs that mechanise some of the steps:
\\@ lemma self_comp_lemma : \SelfCompLemma(loop1, ...);
...
loop1:
\\@ loop invariant \natural_invariant(loop1);
...
An advantage of such an integration is that these annotations
might trigger the generation of auxiliary proof obligations,
such as those required by the functor that generates the self-
composition lemma.
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register unsigned char *d;




































RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,0); if (--i == 0) break;
RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,1); if (--i == 0) break;
RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,2); if (--i == 0) break;
RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,3); if (--i == 0) break;
RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,4); if (--i == 0) break;
RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,5); if (--i == 0) break;






B ACSL loop speciﬁcation
/*@ predicate eqAk{L1,L2}(integer k,
@ unsigned char u1[],
@ unsigned char u2[]) =
@ \forall integer l;
@ l!=k ==> \at(u1[l],L1)==\at(u2[l],L2);
@*/
/*@ predicate eqA{L1,L2}(unsigned char u1[],
@ unsigned char u2[]) =
@ \forall integer l; \at(u1[l],L1)==\at(u2[l],L2);
@*/
/*@ predicate RC4NextKeySymbol{L1,L2}(unsigned char *x,
@ unsigned char *y,
@ unsigned char d[],
@ unsigned char k) =
@ \exists unsigned char tx, unsigned char ty;
@ \at(*x,L2) == ((\at(*x,L1) + 1) & 0xff) ==>
@ tx == \at(d[\at(*x,L2)],L1) ==>
@ \at(*y,L2) == ((tx+\at(*y,L1)) & 0xff) ==>
@ ty == \at(d[\at(*y,L2)],L1) ==>
@ \at(d[\at(*x,L2)],L2) == ty ==>
@ \at(d[\at(*y,L2)],L2) == tx ==>




* Invariant for the first loop in Fig.3.
*/
/*@
@ inductive spec1{L1,L2}(integer i1,integer i2,
@ unsigned char key[],
@ unsigned char *x,
@ unsigned char *y,
@ unsigned char d[]) {
@ case spec1_base{L} :
@ \forall integer i1,integer i2,
@ unsigned char key[],
@ unsigned char *x,
@ unsigned char *y,
@ unsigned char d[];
@ i1 == i2 ==> spec1{L,L}(i1,i2,key,x,y,d);
@ case spec1_step{L1,L2,L3} :
@ \forall integer i1,integer i2,integer i3,
@ unsigned char key[],
@ unsigned char *x,
@ unsigned char *y,
@ unsigned char d[],




@ \at(key[i2],L3) == k ==>
@ i3 == i2 +1 ==>
@ spec1{L1,L3}(i1,i3,key,x,y,d);
@ }
@*/
